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Abstract 
This paper examines collective bargaining and dispute settlement in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industry in 
Lagos State, Nigeria. Collective bargaining as one of the processes of industrial relations performs a variety of 
functions in workplace relations. It could be viewed as a means of industrial jurisprudence (rule making process 
in industry) as well as a form of industrial democracy. It is also a means for resolving workplace conflict 
between labour and management as well as the determination of terms and conditions of employment. Industrial 
disputes are inevitable in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industry. Industrial or trade disputes have both costs 
and benefits to the three social partners and the society at large. These social partners are the government, labour 
and management. However, it should be noted that from experience the costs of industrial disputes have always 
outweighed the benefits. Trade disputes as exemplified by strikes, to a large extent have a great bearing on the 
smooth and orderly development of the economy and the maintenance of law and order in the society. Thus, 
because of the adverse implications of industrial disputes, affected parties often seek speedy settlement of such 
disputes whenever they arise. The grievance procedure forms part of the procedural agreement of the collective 
bargaining agreement, which deals with such matters as the methods to be used and the stages to be followed in 
the settlement of disputes in the workplace. However, the grievance procedure is limited for use within the 
organisation. In the event that this procedure fails to settle the issue at dispute, then the parties can resort to the 
external machinery as provided by public policy as exemplified by mediation, conciliation, arbitration and the 
National Industrial Court (NIC). The existing statutory machinery for the settlement of disputes has not been 
effective in terms of delays experienced by aggrieved parties as well as cumbersomeness of the procedure. 
Oftentimes, judgements drag on for years and justice delayed is justice denied. More so, the statutory dispute 
settlement procedure has not fostered industrial harmony to a large extent. From the foregoing, it is 
recommended that the adoption of collective bargaining and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) should be 
given due consideration by the parties in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industry to settle industrial disputes 
whenever they arise. 
Keywords: Collective Bargaining, Dispute, Settlement, Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industry.  
 
1. Introduction 
Collective bargaining as one of the processes of industrial relations performs a variety of functions in workplace 
relations. It could be viewed as a means of industrial jurisprudence (rule making process in industry) as well as a 
form of industrial democracy. It is also a means for resolving workplace conflict between labour and 
management as well as the determination of terms and conditions of employment. The term “collective 
bargaining was originated by the Webbs to describe the process of agreeing terms and conditions of employment 
through representatives of employers (and possibly their associations) and representatives of employees (and 
probably their unions)” (Rose, 2008, p.274). Rose (2008) posits that collective bargaining is the process whereby 
representatives of employers and employees jointly determine and regulate decisions pertaining to both 
substantive and procedural matters within the employment relationship. The outcome of this process is the 
collective agreement. In the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industry collective bargaining takes place between the 
workers’ union which is the National Union of Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employees (NUFBTE), the senior 
staff union  which is the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Senior Staff Association (FOBTOB) and the 
industry/sectoral employers’ association which is the Association of Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employers 
(AFBTE). AFBTE has about 80 member companies as of 2011 (AFBTE Annual Report, 2011). 
 
Industrial disputes are inevitable in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industry. According to the human relations 
theory of conflict, conflict is a natural occurrence in all groups and organisations. Since conflict is inevitable, the 
human relations view advocates acceptance of conflict. Its proponents argue that it cannot be eliminated and 
there are even times when conflict may benefit a group’s performance. Industrial or trade disputes have both 
costs and benefits to the three social partners and the society at large. These social partners are the government, 
labour and management. However, it should be noted that from experience the costs of industrial disputes have 
always outweighed the benefits. Trade disputes as exemplified by strikes, to a large extent have a great bearing 
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on the smooth and orderly development of the economy and the maintenance of law and order in the society 
(Anyim, Chidi & Ogunyomi, 2012). Thus, because of the adverse implications of industrial disputes, affected 
parties often seek speedy settlement of such disputes whenever they arise. 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine collective bargaining and dispute settlement in the Food, Beverage and 
Tobacco Industry in Lagos State, Nigeria. 
2. Literature Review 
This section examines the origin, conceptual issues and theoretical underpinnings germane to the study. 
2.1 Origin and Conceptual Issues 
Collective bargaining as a concept was coined in 1891 by Beatrice Webb (then Beatrice Potter) in her work on 
Cooperative Movement in Great Britain (Webb & Webb, 1897). The term was also contained in their book titled 
“Industrial Democracy” first published in 1897. The goals of collective bargaining according to Kahn-Freund 
(1972) are industrial peace treaty and at the same time a source of rules and conditions of employment for the 
distribution of work and for the stability of jobs. Davey (1972) views collective bargaining as a continuing 
institutional relationship between an employer entity (government or private) and labour organisation (union or 
association) representing exclusively a defined group of employees of said employer (appropriate bargaining 
unit) concerned with the negotiation, administration, interpretation and enforcement of written agreements 
covering joint understanding as to wages/salaries, rates of pay, hours of work and other conditions of 
employment. The International Labour Organisation (1960): 
Defines collective bargaining as negotiation of working conditions and terms of employment 
between an employer, a group of employers or one or more employers’ organisations, on the 
one hand; and one or more representative workers’ organisations on the other, with a view to 
reaching agreement (p.3). 
 
Collective bargaining is useful for the setting of rules that govern the workplace, and so it is viewed as a means 
of industrial jurisprudence. It is useful for resolving disputes as well as in setting employment terms and 
conditions. On the other hand, negotiation consists essentially of advancing proposals, discussing them, 
receiving counter proposals and resolving differences (Yoder & Staudohar, 1982). The bargaining process 
involves the two sides in making a concerted effort to resolve their differences by negotiation which is a kin to 
haggling of prices in the market place. A bargain is struck when both sides in industry have negotiated and 
reached an agreement. That is to say, collective bargaining is equal to negotiation plus agreement. Put in a 
simple mathematical model B = N+A and N= B–A where B = Collective bargaining; N = negotiation and A = 
Agreement. Reaching agreement is perhaps what makes negotiation equal to bargaining. Otherwise, when 
negotiation goes on endlessly without concrete agreement, then no bargain could have been struck (Fajana, 
2000). The outcome of collective bargaining is the collective agreement which must be enforced by both parties. 
Collective bargaining is used to resolve issues of divergent interests involving the parties. Collective bargaining 
is commonly adopted in unionised companies where the pluralistic ideology is practised. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework of Collective Bargaining 
To improve and further our knowledge and understanding of the concept of collective bargaining, it is important 
to have knowledge of collective bargaining theories. Some of these theories enable us to explain some aspects of 
union and management behaviour as well as the functioning of collective negotiations. The following theories 
are discussed: (i) Chamberlain and Kuhn trichotomy theory (ii) Sidney and Beatrice Webb theory (iii) John 
Thomas Dunlop theory (iv) Allan Flanders theory and (v) Hugh Clegg theory of collective bargaining. 
• Chamberlain and Kuhn Trichotomy Theory 
 Chamberlain and Kuhn in their book titled Collective Bargaining written in 1965; argue that collective   
bargaining theories can be grouped into three broad categories. 
 Marketing theory 
 Industrial governance or governmental theory 
 Industrial management or managerial theory. These theories are expatiated upon below. 
Marketing theory: The marketing theory of collective bargaining, views collective bargaining as a process by 
which labour is bought and sold in the market place. The labour contract with individual worker is replaced with 
collective bargaining. In the process, terms and conditions of employment are agreed between workers and 
employers. This contractual agreement does not only relate to present employees but also to those who will be 
employed in future (Fajana, 2000). However, if the tenure is stated, then the agreement covers the employees 
who take up job within the tenure of the agreement. Consequently, collective bargaining may be viewed as the 
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process by which terms and conditions governing the supply and demand for labour for current and future 
employees are determined. 
 
Industrial governance: This is also called governmental theory of collective bargaining and is viewed as a rule 
making process by which rules governing the relations between management and trade unions are made. Thus, 
the provision of constitutional functions is the basis of the governmental theory of bargaining. It is obvious here 
that collective bargaining is viewed as a political phenomenon, and it performs for industry what the legislative 
process performs for the nation or society.  
 
Industrial management or managerial theory: This theory views collective bargaining as a means through 
which trade unions are involved in sharing managerial prerogatives or functions. This suggests the existence of a 
functional relationship between the unions and employers. It examines the ways in which unions and 
management can combine to reach decisions on matters where both parties have vital interests. In the absence of 
bargaining, management may insist on using its prerogative to manage the company, thereby precluding the 
input of workers. Thus, managerial theory can lead to the furtherance of industrial democracy. 
 
• The Sidney and Beatrice Webb Theory 
Webb and Webb (1897) view collective bargaining as one of the three main methods used by trade unions to 
achieve their basic aim of improving the condition of their members’ working lives. The other two methods are 
mutual insurance (such as cash benefits for sickness, industrial injury, retirement or death) and legal enactment 
(lobby for legislative changes in favour of union members). These methods are also in Rose (2008). According 
to the Webbs, collective bargaining is taken as an alternative to individual bargaining. They view collective 
bargaining as an economic institution, with trade unions acting as a labour cartel by controlling entry into trade. 
The Webbs observed that terms and conditions of employment can be determined in four main ways: unilateral 
determination by the employer, unilateral determination by workers, unilateral determination by the State, as 
well as joint determination by the three social partners. They view all previous three methods as unsatisfactory 
whereas, collective or joint determination by the three social parties is more satisfying and leads to lasting 
satisfaction by the parties.  
• Dunlop Theory 
Dunlop views collective bargaining as the means of rule making which regulates or governs the work place. His 
theory of collective bargaining can be found in his industrial relations system. The rules could be substantive and 
procedural rules which are the outcomes of collective bargaining. The Dunlopian model is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Rose, E.D. (2008). Employment Relations. (3rd ed.). London: Pearson Education Ltd. 
Fig.1:  Model of an Industrial Relations System 
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• Allan Flanders Theory 
Flanders (1970) defines collective bargaining as a social process that continually transforms disagreements into 
agreements in an orderly fashion. Flanders considered collective bargaining to be more of a political than 
economic process, involving rule making and power relationships. Flanders assumption is that basically, 
collective bargaining is an institution for job regulation. This institution can only function effectively in those 
countries that have achieved reasonable level of unionisation. The key to collective bargaining is the acceptance 
of the freedom of association. This freedom can be entrenched in legislation, statutory order, policy statements 
and such other policies of the government in the form of trade union laws. The rules can also appear in the form 
of collective agreements and arbitration awards. Rules also evolve from social organisations like customs and 
practices among cohesive workforce.  Rules can also emerge from management decisions. Flanders concludes 
that since collective bargaining rules define the rights, obligations and privileges of workers jointly and 
severally, they are a means of preventing discrimination, victimisation and favouritism. The greatest advantage 
of collective bargaining as identified by Flanders is that it has become an institution for the promotion of lawful 
employment relations. According to Flanders, both procedural and substantive rules are derived from the rule 
making process of bargaining. 
• Hugh Clegg Theory  
Clegg (1960) views collective bargaining as a form of industrial democracy. The concepts of 
political/parliamentary democracy and industrial democracy are not synonymous. While political/parliamentary 
democracy deals with the government of a country or state, industrial democracy is concerned with the 
government of the workplace or industry. Many a time, the concept of industrial democracy has been equated 
with workers’ participation. Industrial democracy is broader than workers participation. Industrial democracy 
could be viewed from two perspectives. These are workers’ participation and workers’ control (Chidi, 2008). 
Industrial democracy according to Marsh (1971) as cited in Otobo (2005): 
Is an expression with a number of meanings and usages all concerned with the role and status 
of workers in industrial society, and all implying, to a greater or lesser extent, the participation 
of those who work in industry in determining the conditions of their working lives (p.149). 
Hence, industrial democracy may imply workers participation in the form of joint consultation, co-ownership 
and co-determination. According to Clegg, collective bargaining as a form of industrial democracy is analogous 
to parliamentary democracy, except that trade unions are oppositions that could never replace or become 
government. That is, management in industry. However, presenting collective bargaining as parliamentary 
democracy has received mixed reactions from industrial relations experts. Otobo (2005, p.155) argues that “one 
should not liken collective bargaining to parliamentary democracy, if trade unions are an opposition that can 
never become government.”  
• Pre-requisites for Effective Bargaining 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has listed the following pre-requisites for effective bargaining: 
• Freedom of association 
• Favourable political and economic conditions 
• Power relationship 
• Joint authorship of rules 
• Stability of workers’ organisation 
• Avoidance of unfair labour practices on the part of both parties 
• Recognition of trade unions 
• Willingness of the parties to give and take 
• Ability of the parties to negotiate skillfully 
• Willingness to observe or implement the collective agreement that has emerged 
3.   The Structure of Collective Bargaining 
The term bargaining structure according to Farnham and Pimlott (1990, p.149) describes the “stable or 
permanent features that distinguish the bargaining process in any particular system”. It is a framework in which 
negotiation between employers and trade unions takes place and this involves four (4) distinct but related 
features: bargaining level, bargaining unit, bargaining scope and bargaining form.  
• Bargaining Level 
Bargaining level describes the zone at which collective bargaining takes place or is conducted within an 
organisation (Fashoyin, 1992). Essentially, we have the industry-wide bargaining. This is also called centralised, 
centripetal or multi-employer bargaining. There is also the domestic or company level bargaining. This is also 
called decentralised, branch, enterprise, centrifugal or single-employer bargaining. Since 1978, collective 
bargaining in Nigeria has been multi-employer bargaining or industry-wide bargaining. 
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• Bargaining Unit  
Bargaining unit refers to the specific group of employees and employers covered by a particular agreement or set 
of agreements. Collective bargaining takes place between one trade union and one employer or between one 
trade union and two or more employers or between two or more trade unions and one employer or two or more 
trade unions and one employer or two or more trade unions and two or more employers. Thus, bargaining unit 
refers to the composition of the parties involved in the negotiation. According to Fashoyin (1992, p.118), “the 
bargaining unit means any configuration, including workers and employers that is involved or covered by a 
collective agreement.” There is difference between bargaining unit and negotiating unit. Negotiating unit are 
representatives of workers nominated to represent them at the bargaining table. 
• Bargaining Scope 
This refers to the scope of issues involved in negotiation or collective agreements. Thus, bargaining scope is 
used to indicate the range of subjects covered within a particular bargaining unit by its collective agreements. 
The bargaining scope will be better understood in the course of discussing the contents of collective agreements. 
 
• Bargaining Form 
Bargaining form refers to the ways in which an agreement or a set of agreements is recorded whether it is written 
or formally signed like in Nigeria or unwritten and informal.  
4.  Behavioural Theory of Labour Negotiations/Collective Bargaining Behaviour 
 
Several writers have advanced models of collective bargaining behaviour. While it may be appropriate to 
describe collective bargaining as a struggle or an interplay of power relationship during which the union seeks 
more concession and management wanting to give less, it must be stated that the behaviour of the parties during 
negotiation are conditioned by the issues to be negotiated. In a collective bargaining situation, there are usually 
two major groups of issues: the conflict issues where both parties have divergent interests such as wages, hours 
of work, pension etc, and the non-conflict issues where both parties have mutual interests such as health and 
safety, canteen facilities, staff school to mention a few. Walton and Mckersie (1965) identified four models of 
bargaining behaviour. These models are also called the sub-processes of collective bargaining as contained in 
their book, titled “A Behavioural Theory of Labour Negotiations.” These are distributive bargaining posture or 
strategy, integrative bargaining posture of strategy, intra-organisational bargaining posture or strategy and 
attitudinal structuring posture or strategy. 
 
• Distributive Bargaining Strategy 
Whenever the parties in a collective bargaining face a conflict situation and neither party is willing to concede 
since such a concession will represent a loss for one party and a gain to the other, Walton and Mckersie (1965) 
suggested that the best bargaining strategy to use is distributive bargaining. The two parties bargain over the 
division of a pie and the gain of one party is the loss of the other. In real-life negotiations, most of the 
substantive issues fall into this category. Since there is a fixed supply of a resource over which both parties are 
bargaining and as long as no party wants to lose out completely the best strategy is to bargain to distribute the 
resource in a manner that is consistent with the bargaining power of the parties. Thus, a union may make a 
demand for 100 per cent salary increase. Since management would not be willing to grant 100 per cent salary 
increase nor could it walk away without any salary increase no matter how small, it must bargain to meet the 
union’s demand at a percentage point.  
Therefore, the function of distributive bargaining strategy is to resolve a pure collective bargaining issue, that is; 
issue where both parties have divergent interests. Distributive bargaining is the classic type of ‘win-lose’ 
negotiations. In most cases, the outcome is a zero-sum game or fixed-sum game because one party’s gains 
represent loss to the other.  
 
 
• Integrative Bargaining Strategy 
In integrative bargaining, both parties offer solutions that could increase the size of the pie (Fashoyin, 1992). The 
objectives of the parties need not necessarily be divergent, as in the case of distributive bargaining. “Safety and 
security issues, which protect the health and security of workers and at the same time help management in many 
ways, are a typical example (Fashoyin, 1992, p.139).” Thus, integrative bargaining strategy is deployed on 
collective bargaining issues where both parties have mutuality or commonality of interests. Here, the feelings 
and suggestions of both parties are integrated into a common solution to the problem. The essence of integrative 
bargaining is cooperative bargaining towards solving a common problem in a mutually beneficial manner. The 
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main object therefore is to attain a consensus involving equal sacrifice by both parties. For instance, a 50 per cent 
increase in salary would be merged with a corresponding   increase in working hours or productivity gains. This 
is the classic type of “win-win” negotiation. In this process, there would be no loss or gain incurred by both 
parties. Therefore, the process can be described as a non-zero sum game or variable-sum game.  
 
 
• Attitudinal Structuring Strategy  
The outcome of attitudinal structuring is that you get what you give out, that is, it is what you sow that you reap. 
Thus, the outcome of collective bargaining is often the result of the general atmosphere created by the parties 
and their behaviour towards each other before and during negotiations. If the management creates an atmosphere 
of cooperation, trust and confidence, the union’s attitude and response will be cooperative and friendly. 
Attitudinal structuring therefore refers to influencing the parties’ interpersonal relationships particularly those of 
the negotiating team. Emphasis is placed on cultivating attitudes that are conducive to reaching agreement. Key 
elements include cooperativeness, accommodation, trust and mutual respect. Thus, the nature of relationship 
whether based on friendliness or hostility between both parties will to a large extent affect the negotiation 
process. Thus, it is argued that success or failure can be predetermined, depending on how the attitude of both 
parties has been restructured before negotiation. 
 
 
• Intra-Organisational Bargaining Strategy 
Intra-organisational bargaining strategy refers to the internal bargaining within each side of the bargaining unit. 
It also means bargaining within one’s own group or constituency. The major thrust here is that both parties 
should be able to achieve a consensus at the end of the negotiation. Management team may meet among 
themselves so as to determine the reasonable level of concession that can be profitably made. Similarly, for trade 
unions in particular; intra organisational bargaining helps to minimise dissatisfaction which may occur when 
demands made on management do not reflect the interests of all interest groups within the union. Failure to 
ensure that popular demands are made may lead to factionalisation or balkanisation of the union.  Finally, the 
theoretical framework presented by Walton and Mckersie helps us to understand the importance of the influences 
on the negotiation process and the complex behavioural issues in union/management relations.  
  
5.  Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Collective bargaining is not an end in itself but a means to an end. Collective bargaining gives rise or birth to 
collective agreement, which according to the ILO is a crucial aspect of the collective bargaining process. That is, 
workers and their employers embark on collective bargaining with a view to reaching agreement. Collective 
agreements can be subsumed under two broad categories. These are: 
• Substantive agreements 
• Procedural agreements   
Substantive agreements refer to wages, working hours and other terms and conditions of employment. Whereas, 
procedural agreements, deal with such matters as the methods to be used and the stages to be followed in the 
settlement of disputes, periodicity of meetings, and the duration of the existing agreement. Procedural 
agreements are those that deal with procedures governing the employment relationship and concern issues such 
as renewal clauses, grievance procedures, as well as contract amendment or renegotiation. 
 
5.1 Contents of a Collective Agreement   
Collective agreement contains both the procedural and substantive issues as exemplified by the following: 
recognition clause, scope of agreement, management clause, declaration of principles, change of designation, 
probation and probationary employees; stoppages of work, interpretation as well as implementation of collective 
agreement. Joint consultative committee meetings between the company and the union, grievance procedure, 
check-off dues, meal allowance, electricity or utility allowance, furniture loan, hours of work, public holidays, 
annual leave, accident at work, maternity leave and benefits, acting allowance and disciplinary procedure.  
Retirement and gratuity, contributory pension scheme, duration of agreement,  termination of employment, 
promotion and merit increase, rent subsidy, annual increments rate, shift work and allowance, field allowance, 
vehicle loan and transport allowance, wages and salaries, end-of-year bonus, redundancy benefits, exclusion of 
new demands etc.  Fashoyin (1992, p.129) observes that in any collective agreement there are three distinct 
issues namely:  
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• “Negotiable or Mandatory Issues: This refers to those issues which management and union have 
agreed to negotiate upon. While no law explicitly specifies these issues, wage and salary issues and a 
host of other conditions of employment are recognised by the Labour Act of 1974 as falling within the 
collective bargaining process some of these issues have been mentioned above.  
• Voluntary or Discussion Issues: These are those middle-range issues which are neither mandatory nor 
exclusive to management, but upon which both sides can discuss. Expectedly, the number of issues in 
this category is generally few. The issues include the following; shift work, housing scheme, end-of-year 
gifts, payment of union officials during union meeting, long service awards to mention a few. Also, 
issues between the mandatory and voluntary categories overlap; this indicates the degree of variation in 
bargaining relationships. 
 
• Managerial Issues: These are those issues on which management exercise full control in decision 
making, such as appointments, promotion, demotion, staff control and discipline, termination, dismissal 
and retirement of staff, transfer and posting, introduction of technical improvement and decision to 
modify, extend, curtail or cease operation. A number of agreements recognise the right of the union to 
consult on the managerial issues and, more often than not, unions find a way of influencing decisions on 
some of these managerial issues.”  
 
6. The Practical Process of Collective Bargaining and the generalised Bargaining Model 
In the bargaining process, it is usual for the two sides, that is, the union and management to make offers and 
demands. According to Warr (1973) union negotiators base their bids or claim/initial demand on a number of 
factors such as company’s profitability, cost of living, bargaining power and equity of differentials. Equity of 
differentials is of two types, horizontal and vertical equity. The principle of horizontal equity which is contained 
in such slogans as “equal pay for equal work” implies that a group of workers who have similar skills and job 
position but are in different establishments would fight to earn approximately the same wages. On the other 
hand, vertical equity persists when the more highly skilled occupational groups pressurise the employer to 
maintain the gap between their earnings and those of other groups-the unskilled or semi-skilled workers. Thus, 
the existence of such grades of labour as highly skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled would necessarily bring 
differential pay rates into existence. The other three factors are self explanatory. In most bargaining process, 
trade unions usually initiate actions by serving a list of demands on their employer, except under the system 
pioneered by General Electric Company in the United States in the 1950s. The system called “Boulwarism” is 
named after Lemuel Boulware General Electric Company’s Vice President of Industrial Relations and the 
architect of the policy (Katz & Kochan, 2004).  According to Katz and Kochan (2004), Boulwarism is a new 
form of non-union human resource management practice. It is a practice whereby the employer first makes an 
offer based on researched-based and industry-average rates of pay to which organised labour or union would 
respond (Fajana, 2000). But because such rates were based on an honest study of existing trends, workers could 
hardly have anything to object. Over time, this custom/practice had become widely adopted first in America and 
later in global workplaces (Fajana, 2000). 
Employees’ initial demands are usually inflated because of the belief that employers are likely to negotiate such 
demands downwards. However, employees have a minimum point below which they will not accept the 
employer’s offer. They also have an objective or target point as well as a maximum point or initial demand or 
claim, which is strategically not disclosed except to a few trusted union negotiators. Similarly, employers have a 
maximum point, an objective or target point as well as its initial offer or minimum point. Ordinarily, negotiation 
involves coming up on the side of the employer and going down on the part of the union until a bargain is struck. 
The probability of striking a bargain depends on two important ranges namely:  
• The range of indeterminateness or the negotiating range. 
• The range of practical bargaining or settlement range. 
The range of indeterminateness or negotiating range is the point between the union’s claim or initial demand and 
the employer’s initial offer, whereas, the range of practical bargaining or settlement range is the distance 
between the employer’s maximum and employees’ minimum. For a bargain to be struck, the two ranges must 
overlap. When the two ranges fail to overlap, an impasse or deadlock can result from the bargaining relationship. 
For proper understanding of the discussion on the practical process of collective bargaining, it will be ideal to 
depict the generalised bargaining model.  
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Source: Adapted from Fajana (2000) and Armstrong (2006) 
Fig.2: The generalised Bargaining Model 1 
 Above model shows negotiating range with settlement range or range of practical bargaining. When the 
employer’s maximum exceeds the union minimum, this indicates settlement range and there is possibility of 
settlement or a bargain here, as there is an overlap in the ranges.  A second scenario is depicted to differentiate 
the above model and to determine the possibility of an impasse or deadlock in the bargaining process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Fajana (2000) and Armstrong (2006) 
Fig.3: The generalised Bargaining Model 2 
Above model shows negotiating range with a negotiating gap or range of indeterminateness with nil range of 
practical bargaining. When the employer’s maximum is less than the union minimum, this indicates negotiating 
gap or nil range of practical bargaining. In this scenario there is possibility of an impasse or deadlock. Here there 
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is no overlap in the range.  Finally, it should be noted that negotiating range is the same as range of 
indeterminateness which is described by the point of initial demand or claim of the union and the initial offer of 
the employer or management. The settlement range is the same as the range of practical bargaining which is 
described by the distance between the union’s minimum and the employer’s maximum. The range of practical 
bargaining is the zone where agreement is possible. It must be understood that in real-life negotiations, the 
minimum and maximum points of the parties are not known. Perhaps, the employer might know his maximum 
but the union often does not have an upper limit.  
7. Collective Bargaining in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industry 
In Nigeria, collective bargaining occupies a pride of place in the determination of employment terms and 
conditions in the private sector otherwise called the organised private sector (OPS). Since 1978, the structure of 
collective bargaining in the private sector has been predominantly multi-employer bargaining at the industry 
level. In some industries, collective bargaining has been recognised as inevitable. The negotiating body for 
multi-employer bargaining is known at the National Joint Industrial Council (NJIC) consisting of an equal 
representation of the employers and labour unions. All procedural agreements embody what is commonly 
referred to as the Constitution of the NJIC. At the company level, another relevant body for consultation is the 
Joint Consultative Committee (JCC). Thus, collective bargaining in the private sector may take place between 
the representatives of employer association and trade union within the industry. In the Food, Beverage and 
Tobacco Industry, for instance; collective bargaining takes place between the workers union, National Union of 
Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employees (NUFBTE) or the senior staff union- the Food, Beverage and Tobacco 
Senior Staff Association (FOBTOB) and the industry employers’ association-the Association of Food, Beverage 
and Tobacco Employers (AFBTE) which has about 80 member companies as of 2011 (AFBTE Annual Report, 
2011).  Items that may be negotiated at the industry-wide levels (nationally negotiated items) may include wages 
and salaries, overtime, hours of work, annual leave, allowance and bonuses to mention a few. Items negotiated at 
the enterprise or company level between each company and the respective unions may reflect such items that 
have elements of peculiarity among firms in the industry. These may include shift arrangement, end of year 
bonus, pension and long service awards. FOBTOB has since 1980, signed a Procedural Agreement with the 
Association of Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employers (AFBTE) to govern the relationship between the two 
bodies and have jointly negotiated and signed into place a Collective Agreement on Conditions of Service for its 
members in the industry. This Agreement represents acceptable minimum standards for the industry subject to 
improvements from company to company depending on favourable business conditions. 
A Collective Agreement on consequential adjustment in salaries was reached in December, 2000 as a result of 
the introduction of the new National Minimum Wage by the Federal Government on the 1st of May, 2000. To 
reach an agreement on this matter, the Association had to embark on a nation-wide strike. A new Collective 
Agreement on the review of salaries and fringe benefits was consequently signed on the 11th of April, 2002 with 
32 per cent increase in salaries. In 2004, Collective Agreement was signed with 25 per cent increase in basic 
salaries among other increases on the allowances. Year 2006 witnessed the implementation of 24 per cent 
increase in salaries and fringe benefits. In November, 2010; another increment of 25 per cent was recorded. 
FOBTOB signed an agreement with AFBTE to annualise gratuity in the industry rather than have the gratuity 
scheme scraped. The extant Collective Agreement with NUFBTE and FOBTOB was renewed in November, 
2012. 
8. Grievance Procedures/Settlement of Workplace Disputes in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industry 
in Nigeria 
The grievance procedure forms part of the procedural agreement of the collective bargaining agreement, which 
deals with such matters as the methods to be used and the stages to be followed in the settlement of disputes in 
the workplace. Most collective agreements incorporate the grievance procedure to be applied in the event of 
disputes. However, the grievance procedure is limited for use within the organisation. In the event that this 
procedure fails to settle the issue at dispute, then the parties can resort to the external machinery as provided by 
public policy as exemplified by mediation, conciliation, arbitration and the National Industrial Court (NIC). This 
is otherwise called the statutory mechanisms for the settlement of trade dispute in Nigeria. A trade dispute is 
defined “as any dispute between employers and workers or between workers and workers, which is connected 
with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment and the physical conditions of work of 
any person” (Aturu, 2005, p.109). Many a time these procedures have been employed in the Food, Beverage and 
Tobacco Industry in Nigeria to settle trade disputes. The statutory procedures to be followed in settling dispute 
could be found in the Trade Dispute Decree No. 7, of 1976; as amended by the Trade Dispute (Amendment) 
Decree No. 54 of 1977. This decree acknowledges the role of voluntary grievance procedures in the settlement of 
trade dispute and accordingly requires parties to a dispute to first attempt settling their disagreement by the 
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existing agreed procedures for settlement of dispute. However, in the event that the grievance procedures fail to 
resolve the dispute, then the parties shall report the dispute to the Minister of Labour and Productivity. The 
following entails the external settlement procedures which are formal in nature: (i) mediation (ii) conciliation 
(iii) Arbitration (iv) National Industrial Court (v) Board of Enquiry. There is also the informal machinery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Fajana (2006) 
Fig.4: Model of Disputes Settlement Mechanisms in Nigeria 
• Mediation  
Under the Trade Dispute Act, if the attempt to settle the dispute via an enterprise’s own machinery and 
procedures fails, or if no such agreed means of settlement exists, the parties shall within seven (7) days of the 
failure (or where no such means exist within seven (7) days of the date on which the disputes arise or is first 
apprehended) meet together either by themselves through their representative under the presidency of a mediator 
mutually agreed upon and appointed by or on behalf of the parties, with a view to peaceful settlement of the 
dispute. Where this fails any of the parties intending to pursue the matter further is required to declare a trade 
dispute and inform the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity within fourteen (14) days of the failure to 
settle the dispute in writing. It should be noted that the above procedures not withstanding; where a trade dispute 
is apprehended by the Ministry of Labour and Productivity, the Minister may in writing inform the parties of his 
apprehension and of the steps he intends to take in order to resolve the dispute. 
• Conciliation  
When mediation fails, the Minister of Labour and Productivity may appoint a conciliator from among a crop of 
professional labour officers in the Ministry for the purpose of settling the dispute (Section 6 of the Act). The 
conciliator is expected to enquire into the causes and circumstance of the dispute and by negotiating with the 
parties endeavour to effect a settlement. If settlement of the dispute is reached within fourteen (14) days of the 
appointment of a conciliator, the conciliator shall forward a memorandum of the terms of the settlement duly 
signed by the disputing parties or their agents to the Minister. However, if conciliation fails to resolve the 
dispute, then the Minister is informed within 21 days of the end of the conciliation meeting. The Minister then 
refers the dispute to the next stage in the settlement procedure which is Arbitration. 
• Arbitration 
This marks the beginning of the judicial processes for resolving conflict. Unlike conciliation, arbitration is not 
voluntary to the extent that an award rather than mere recommendation is made to which the parties must comply 
unless an appeal is filed. Thus, if the conciliator fails to reach settlement within fourteen (14) days of his/her 
appointment, he/she shall report the situation to the Minister of Labour and Productivity who will then refer such 
disputes to the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) within fourteen (14) days of the failure of the conciliator. The 
arbitrators at the IAP are drawn from government, employers and workers representative with a legal person as 
the chairman. Notice of the award of IAP is usually communicated to the Minister of Labour and Productivity 
within 42 days, who in turn sends a copy of the award to the parties or their representatives. Any objection to the 
IAP award by any of the parties should be communicated to the Minister in the specified manner within 21 days, 
otherwise the Minister if satisfied with the award must proceed to confirm it and the award shall be binding on 
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both parties to whom it relates and published in a public gazette. IAP could be likened to the civil courts but 
unlike the civil courts, litigant cannot go to it directly. It must be done through the Minister of Labour. The 
arbitrators listen to the two sides and call for evidence when necessary and make decision or award which is 
binding on the parties unless an appeal is filed. Thus, if the parties object to the award, the Minister refers the 
dispute to the National Industrial Court (NIC) for final determination. 
• National Industrial Court   
If the disputing parties do give a notice of objection to the Minister within 21 days of the release of arbitration 
award, the Minister shall forthwith refer the dispute to the National Industrial Court (NIC). The NIC has 
exclusive jurisdictions to make awards for the purpose of settling trade disputes; to determine questions as to the 
interpretation of any collective agreements. The court has appellate jurisdiction in respect of cases which have 
been heard by the IAP and to which objection has been raised. There is no appeal to any other body as this is the 
apex court for the settlement of trade disputes. The award of the NIC is final and binding on the parties in 
dispute. The NIC is made up of a president and 4 other members making a total of 5 members. The NIC was 
established by the Trade Dispute Act of 1976, now Trade Disputes Act, Cap 432 Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria 1990, but was first inaugurated on the 5th of June, 1978. The NIC is the final arbiter of industrial conflict 
or dispute. In 1992, the Trade Disputes Act was amended by the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Decree No. 47 of 
1992. This amendment divests the regular courts of jurisdiction to entertain cases on trade disputes and intra or 
inter-union disputes. By virtue of the amendment, appeals from the decision of the National Industrial Court are 
heard by the Court of Appeal, provided such appeals border on fundamental human rights or fundamental human 
rights cases as contained in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. With the 
NIC Amendment Act (2006), the NIC is now a superior court of record just like the State High Courts, Federal 
High Courts, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court for labour matters. As a superior court of record, the NIC 
will no longer be subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the State and Federal High Courts. It no longer shares 
jurisdiction with the High Courts and enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over labour, trade union and industrial 
relations matters. Unlike, under the old Trade Dispute Act, with the 2006 NIC Amendment Act, a party can 
approach the NIC as a court of first instance. A party does not need to first go to the IAP before having access to 
the NIC. With respect to the relationship between the NIC and the Minister of Labour and Productivity, in the 
new 2006 Act, the NIC has no direct relationship with the Minister. An individual has the right to refer the 
decision of the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) to the NIC and not through the Minister.  
• Board of Enquiry or Investigation and Formal Enquiry 
The Trade Dispute Act empowered the Minister of Labour and Productivity to set up a board of enquiry to look 
into the causes and circumstances of trade disputes. The board serves as a means of informing the government 
and members of the public regarding the facts and the underlying causes of trade disputes. The Minister is able 
to set up the board of enquiry without the consent of the disputing parties. The board is appointed as a last resort 
when the dispute is likely to have serious effects on public interests and it is necessary to clear the air and 
dispose of it expeditiously. The board’s duty would be to enquire into the matter referred to it and to report 
thereafter to the Minister of Labour. 
• Informal Machinery  
Aside from the statutory procedures highlighted above, some unions and management agree that certain 
influential personalities be involved in settling their disputes. Such people may be state governors, natural rulers 
or religious leaders. They may be brought in at any stage of the dispute.  The confidence reposed in such people 
stems from the cultural imperative of Nigerians where a lot of respect is bestowed on elders and natural rulers. 
From personal insights, Nigeria Employers’ Consultative Association (NECA) has deployed Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) to assist settle trade disputes involving their members. In some other cases the State makes 
available its police to play conflict regulating roles (Fajana, 1992). 
9. Conclusion and Recommendations 
This paper set out to examine collective bargaining and dispute settlement in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco 
Industry in Lagos State, Nigeria. Collective bargaining as one of the processes of industrial relations performs a 
variety of functions in workplace relations.  One of such functions is the settlement of workplace disputes 
between labour and management. Industrial disputes are inevitable in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industry. 
However, it should be noted that from experience the costs of industrial disputes have always outweighed the 
benefits. Trade disputes as exemplified by strikes, to a large extent have a great bearing on the smooth and 
orderly development of the economy and the maintenance of law and order in the society. Thus, because of the 
adverse implications of industrial disputes, affected parties often seek speedy settlement of such disputes 
whenever they arise. The grievance procedure forms part of the procedural agreement of the collective 
bargaining agreement, which deals with such matters as the methods to be used and the stages to be followed in 
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the settlement of disputes in the workplace. Most collective agreements incorporate the grievance procedure to 
be applied in the event of disputes. However, the grievance procedure is limited for use within the organisation.  
In the event that this procedure fails to settle the issue at dispute, then the parties can resort to the external 
machinery as provided by public policy as exemplified by mediation, conciliation, arbitration and the National 
Industrial Court (NIC). The existing statutory machinery for the settlement of disputes has not been effective in 
terms of delays experienced by aggrieved parties as well as cumbersomeness of the procedure. Oftentimes, 
judgements drag on for years and justice delayed is justice denied. More so, the statutory dispute settlement 
procedure has not fostered industrial harmony to a large extent. From the foregoing, it is recommended that the 
adoption of collective bargaining and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) should be given due consideration 
by the parties in the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Industry to settle industrial disputes whenever they arise. 
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